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William Faulkner, Addie Bundren, and Language
by Richard Godden
I
It is a commonplace that in 1917 a generation of Americans went
 
to war for soiled words and came back determined to purify them.
 Hemingway knew that “glory,” “sacrifice,” “sacred” belonged in the
 meat yards of Chicago. Dos Passos could taste how “the clean words
 our fathers spoke” had been 
“
slimed and fouled.” E. E. Cummings  
in the Enormous Room of a
 
French prison  reverenced a  man  called  
Zulu who could only emit the phonetic noises “Muh” and “Mog,” but
 who was “a master of the well
 
chosen silence.” The consensus had it  
that language
 
was  in  decay. To stop the rot Hemingway  retreated  to  
small concrete words. Dos Passos piled up more and more
 
evidence.  
E.  E. Cummings, like the Dadaists, longed to bury printed matter  
under blocks of abstract color so that dirtied words might be seen as
 just one of
 
the resources available to the artist—a diminished one.
Faulkner was never an ambulance driver. He got no nearer war
­time Europe than a Royal Air Force
 
training camp in Canada—but I  
would like to suggest that, by using peculiarly Southern values
 against Southern myths, Faulkner achieves a purification of lan
­guage not only more astringent than any of his American contem
­poraries, but strikingly different in kind from the linguistic attitudes
 that characterized the major modern figures, Joyce, Eliot, and
 Pound.
To back up the claim, I shall analyze a passage from the Addie
 
Bundren section of As I Lay Dying. This
 
may  seem a narrow way  into  
a broad subject, but Faulkner critics have long focused on Addie
 Bundren in their debate about Faulkner and language. I think that
 too often they choose the wrong piece of Addie Bundren and so
 
fail  
to hear the details of what she is saying.
II
“
He did not know that he was dead, then. Sometimes I would lie by him in  
the dark, hearing the land that was now of my blood and flesh, and I would
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until after 
a
 while I could see the word as a shape, a vessel, and I would watch  
him liquefy and flow into it like cold molasses flowing out of the darkness
 into the vessel, until the jar stood full and motionless: a significant shape
 profoundly without life like an empty door frame; and then 
I
 would find  
that I had forgotten the name of the jar. I would think: The shape of my
 body where I used to be a virgin is in the shape of 
a 
and I couldn’t think
Anse, couldn’t remember Anse. It was not that 
I
 could think of myself as no  
longer unvirgin, because I was three now. And then I would think Cash and
 
Dar
l that way until their names would die and solidify into a shape and then  
fade away. I would say, All right. It doesn’t matter. It doesn’t matter what
 they call them.”1
“
Anse. Why Anse. Why are you Anse.” Addie is in fact asking a  
riddle which could be worded, “When is the man Anse, the word
 Anse?” Riddles
 
work by reducing several  terms to one term, “When  
is a door not a door? When it’s ajar.” A door and ajar are not the
 same thing but the riddle, working on the pun in “ajar,” tricks two
 words, “door” and “jar,” for a moment into one, “ajar.” The game
 pleases because it promotes a mystery and solves it with a solution
 that is at once
 
satisfying  and impossible; a door is no more ajar than  
a man is a word.




fit his  name. Her attempt asserts that language is a literal  
system, within which each word exists in a one to one relationship
 with a thing. Addie by asking the question, “How does a man earn
 his name?” tries to guarantee the answer, “Because it is natural to
 him.” She takes as her model for the naturalness of language a
 proper name, the most referential of terms (a man’s name very
 rarely needs to be
 
explained,  it usually points to  one  particular man,  
unless there happen to be five Anses in the room at any one time).
 But Addie is still not sure that the riddle is going to
 
give her the right  
answer—after all the name “Anse” is a word consisting of four
 arbitrary phonemes: in the cause of naturalness, Addie
 
substitutes a  
storage jar for the
 
word “Anse” and takes her riddles to the kitchen  
where she pours Anse’s blood like molasses
 
into  that jar. Rephrased,  
the riddle reads, “When is the man Anse
 
a storage jar?” The answer,  
“[when he is] a significant shape profoundly without life like an
 empty doorframe.” This is an approximate answer since it
 
replaces  
the vessel with a shape that is only “like” an empty doorframe; it is
1 William Faulkner, As I Lay Dying (The Modern Library,
 
New York, 1967), p. 165.  
Subsequent pagination refers to this edition.
2




however significant on two counts: it is
 
lifeless, i.e., Anse’s blood has  
coagulated into a cold molasses; it is nameless, “and then I would
 find I had forgotten the name of
 
the jar.” The solution that substi ­
tutes a
 
pot for Anse and a  doorframe for both, may seem to mystify  
more than to satisfy. Nonetheless each substitution is one stage in a
 systematic purification. A word is remade as an object and that object
 becomes an empty space seen through an open door. During the
 cleaning up a man dies and his name is erased. The doorjamb that
 marks the last in this series of substitution is hardly an answer to the
 riddle but it is a shape that has a double characteristic. It is a silent
 and apparently empty space. It can be diagramatized. Addie has
 not solved her problem, but she has rephrased it 
as
 a threshold that a  
riddle might cross.
Addie lives in a physical world; neither she nor her thoughts
 
escape the limits of the Bundren farm; her imagination works with
 the resources of the Mississippi hill country, and her language
 reflects the physical realities
 
of her surroundings. Just as  she keeps a  
clean house so she uses a neat language in which
 
words must have a  
physically realizable value. Words come to her mind much as domes
­tic utensils might come to her hand—pots, doorframes, spiders,
 molasses, clothes, and blood. She insists that even abstractions can be
 tidied
 
away into  physical objects by the simple expedient of compar ­
ing them to those objects:
We had to use one another 
by
 words like spiders dangling by their mouths  
from 
a
 beam (p. 164)
words that are not deeds . . . coming down like the cries of geese out of the
 
wild
 darkness (p. 166)
I would think of sin as garments which 
we
 would remove (p. 166)
The similes like the riddles are quite undisguised. In each case
 
Addie substitutes a thing for an abstraction—spiders for dialogue,
 geese cries
 
for words, garments for sin; the substitutions are justified  
by the silent assumption that nothing could be more natural. Addie’s
 imagination, like her domesticity, dislikes loose ends and so her
 monologue is full of riddles and geometries whose resolution is
 simply a matter of tidying up.
Having set the molasses jar
 
aside in an insecure mental niche, she  
tries the riddle of Anse’s name again.
 
Addie, lying in bed, “by (Anse)  
in the dark,” touches her own slackening body and finds another
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entrance in the shape of ajar—under her hand she has material for
 
a further riddle:
I would think: the shape of my body where I used to 
be
 a virgin is in the  
shape of a and I couldn’t 
think
 Anse, couldn’t remembering. (p. 165)
The missing word marked by the gap in the typography could be
 
one of two: “hymen55 (“the shape of my body where I used to be a
 virgin is in the shape of a hymen55) OR “phallus55 (“the shape of my
 body where I used to be a virgin is in the shape of a phallus55 [that
 broke the hymen]). Ideally the word should incorporate both. Addie
 needs a word that will trick the two into one. That word is “Anse,”
 since it was his phallus that broke her hymen. But even now, know
­ing the answer, Addie will not use the word. (“
I
 couldn’t think Anse”  
implies that she couldn’t think of the name then, but can now.)
 Instead she leaves a space 
in
 the print. By doing this she is describing  
her hymen as a space without words—the pause is a blank thought;
 blank because it is silent, silent because Addie has made a choice.
 Addie has linked “hymen” or virginity to silence, and this involves a
 rejection of the equally likely answer which would link “phallus” or
 fertility to a word—“Anse.”
2 Faulkner allows even Henry Sutpen 
the
 fleeting suspicion that his sister’s virgin ­
ity is precious only insofar as it is there to be taken:
Henry was the provincial, 
the
 clown almost, given to instinctive  and violent action,  
rather than
 
to thinking, who may have been conscious that his fierce provincial’s pride  
in his sister’s virginity was a fake quality which incorporated in itself an inability to
 endure in order to be precious, to 
exist,
 and so must depend upon its loss, absence to  
have existed at all. Absalom, Absalom! (Chatto and Windus, London, 1960), p. 440.
 Subsequent 
pagination
 refers to this edition.
It is typical of Faulkner that virginity like silence is a negative
 
value: virginity exists as a felt reality at and after the moment of its
 loss; silence can best be heard after noise.2 Nevertheless for a mo
­ment in Addie’s mind the negative value exists as a positive. The
 pure space in the text is the positive answer to her riddle, “When is
 the man Anse, the word Anse?”, which could be rephrased as the
 riddle of language, “Why is a man, a word?” Answer, “because he is
 the violator of an original and silent purity.” But farmers’ wives have
 no use for such answers and Addie moves away from the riddling
 gap, to the fact of being the mother of two:
It was not 
that
 I could think of myself as no longer unvirgin, because I was  
three now (p. 165)
4
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This escape from a difficult riddle is as unsatisfactory
 
as it is labored.  
The triple negative, cancelled out, leaves “I could not think of myself
 as being a virgin.” But an “un” and a “no” are not easily disposed of.
 It is impossible to make a total denial in literature because the
 positive sign remains in printed
 
evidence and more often  than not is  
longer than the negative. Addie wants to forget the riddle and its
 tiresome equations—“virginity = silence,” “fertility = language”—
 but her evasion draws attention to itself; a regrown hymen, a word
 like “unvirgin,” and the hasty erasure of two sons are not easily
 passed. Furthermore, her compromise solution (I should imagine
 one of the most quoted pieces
 
of literary graphmanship) is patently a  
falsification:
And so when Cora Tull would 
tell
 me I was not a true mother, I would think  
how words 
go
 straight up in a thin line, quick and harmless, and how terribly  
doing goes along the earth, clinging to it, so that after a while the two lines
 are too far apart for the same person to straddle from one to the other,
 (p. 165)
This formula is reached because Cora nagged and a riddle proved
 
problematic, but it, more
 
than any other statement in the novels, has  
stimulated influential generalizations about Faulkner’s attitude to
­ward language. Olga Vickery’s is
 
typical: “one of his basic attitudes is  
that language and logic act to obscure truth rather than to reveal
 it. . . barrenness attends all discussion.”3 The remark is I believe
 doubly mistaken; in As I Lay Dying as a whole, words are inseparable
 from acts—Whitfield, with
 
a voice “bigger than himself,” is a man  of  
words who breaks his word—for Addie he 
“
does,” but having  
crossed a river in flood, he fails to “do,” that is to “say.” Anse, a less
 tautological example, is forced by a promised word to get to Jeffer
­son. While doing 
so
 he behaves like a man who knows that bridges  
down, teams lost, and barns burned earn him a place in every
 barber’s shop, on every porch, and anywhere in Yoknapatawpha
 where stories are told. Anse does too become a byword. In Addie’s
 section, the graph | does not
 
match the shape | ] or its modified  
version “
 
”, printed as a gap in the text. General claims about
3 Olga Vickery, The Novels of William
 
Faulkner (Louisiana State University Press,  
1959), p. 8.
Faulkner’s view of words will have to come to terms with the hole in
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the text, rather than with a verbal graph drawn in exasperation to
 
obscure the issue.
A great deal of Addie’s section leads the reader back to“ ” or at
 
least to a sense
 
of an unstated theme. There are several points in  the  
monologue where
 
questions are almost asked, whose answers imply  
a subtext which, recovered from Addie’s inarticulacy, would offer an
 account of language 
so
 complete that  it would also be an account of  
the world.
That’s when I learned that words are no good; that words don’t even fit what
 
they are trying to say at (p. 163)
“At” is awkward; it gives direction to speech which is not generally
 




that the  word was like the  others, just a  shape to fill a  
lack” (p. 164). The word that is a shape to fill a lack, rather than a
 gap, is the sign of some original loss which caused the “lack.” How
 did this loss occur?
OR:
I would think of him dressed in 
sin.
 I would think of him as thinking of me  
dressed also in sin, he the more beautiful since the garment which he had
 exchanged for sin was sanctified. I would think of the 
sin
 as garments which  
we would remove in order to hape and coerce the terrible blood to the
 forlorn echo of the dead word high in the air. (pp. 166-67)
Addie’s adultery is sinful before it is sexual—it is the sin that makes
 
her hot for it. The stripping of the clothes is dogmatically urgent.
 Clearly Whitfield did not have Addie, as he must have had any
 number of Addies behind
 
the tent at a revivalist meeting. She “took”  
him because he was “the instrument ordained by god” with whom
 adultery would be an offence “utter” and “terrible” enough to echo
 the original sin. God would have to hear. If the sob of their passion
 could be shaped it might do more than echo above them through the
 woods. Addie has
 
been taught by Anse’s usage that the “dead word”  
is “love.” The image she uses here shapes an echo into a vessel and
 fills it with blood. A word that is flesh is one that regains value,
 proving by its quasi-religious example that all words might regain
 their values, and in so
 
doing fall silent. That term which  is natural is  
6
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never more than an echo, because, as a shared meaning, it doesn’t
 
need saying. In the adulterous episode that Addie describes, purity
 grows from profanity and silence rises out of a word. On whose
 authority do such events occur?
OR:
But then I realized that I had been tricked by words older than Anse or love,
 
and that the same words had tricked Anse too (p. 164)





the unstated  question raises the issue of the origins  of  
language. Addie has been trained to
 
almost ask this kind of question.  
She is the child of Fundamentalist theology. Her father traced the
 Calvinist stress on Original Sin to its logical dismissal of life, for
­mulating it for his daughter as the central text “The reason for living
 is getting ready to stay dead a long time” (p. 167). Her lover must
 have reinforced the lesson: named for George Whitfield, an
 eighteenth-century circuit rider who claimed, “The fall of man is
 written in too legible characters not to be understood: Those that
 deny it by their denying prove it”.4 The remark is well within
 demagogic range of itinerant preachers during the 30’s, who em
­ployed a similar rhetoric to persuade their congregations as to the
 originality of their sin. The tone of Addie’s section is therefore
 understandably doctrinal. She inhabits a
 
spiritual and geographical  
region where fundamentalist sects insisted upon the value of per
­sonal testimony. Southern Presbyterianism and Southern Method
­ism both stress that each man talks directly to God, and is a micro
­cosm of the Fall and of a problematic redemption. However,
 
neither  
institution offers a measure of whether or not the testifier is saved
 beyond more of the same, more systematic self scrutiny, more per
­sonal testimony. Driven in on itself by the absence of theological
 certainty the puritan imagination has
 
often been solipsistic. Alterna ­
tively it avoids doubt by adopting conviction: Doc Hines and
 McEachern are a type common in Yoknapatawpha. Addie vacil




 Whitfield, “The Seed of the Woman and the Seed of the Serpent,”  
collected in Selected Sermons of George Whitfield (The Banner of Truth Trust, London,
 1959), p. 85.
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fanaticism is desperate. Her language is at once private and dra
­
matic, riddles appear next to profundities. Obscurity generates 
its own rhetoric, and the monologue might at times
 
be a sermon whose  
terms are as cryptic and convinced as any that Hightower gave to
 Jefferson. One thing is plain. Addie has a conviction, beyond per
­sonal arrogance, about the representative originality of everything
 in her
 
life. Her virginity, to her, was the first that was ever lost; her  
adultery occurs in the eye of God; her children might well be divided
 tribes; her refusal of
 
Anse is murder and her words are as new as  
Adam’s—none of them is expendable since each word must contain
 what it names, in a word so ideally natural that it need not be said and
 can be left silent.
Addie’s world is filled with oppositions, between death and life,
 
deed and word, Whitfield and Anse, child and child. The point
 about what I am rather unsatisfactorily going to call her rage for
 origination is that the secondary term of every opposition must be
 reabsorbed by the primary. For example, male and female exist as
 an opposition, but when Addie remembers her marriage bed she
 absorbs Anse and can no longer imagine him; as she puts it, “I took
 Anse.” The problem for the reader is how have
 
the  two become one,  
just how has the opposition between the sexes been overcome; why is
 living a preparation for death, or linguistically in the case
 
of the  first  
riddle, how does a man become his name?
Effectively Addie never gives us the answer, but led by her com
­
pulsive mixture of intuitive linguistics and primitive nonconform
­ism, it is, I believe, possible to attempt one. Addie frequently men
­tions “dark voicelessness” (p. 166) “voiceless speech” (p. 167) and
 “the dark land talking of God’s love” (p. 166); because this language
 is silent it must be associated with the silent gap in the text, and so
 form part of a clue to the first riddle. A remark like “the dark land
 talking of God’s love” implies some original place, where in an
 earlier time a language was spoken that man can no longer hear.
 Since this place is linked to the gap in the text it must be a presexual
 place in a prelinguistic time: the nearest symbolic approximations
 that Addie can offer are the hymen and silence.
Given Addie’s compulsion to understand what she cannot quite
 
understand, a hypothetical piecing together of the story served by
 these symbols seems justified. It is a version of Genesis set in Eden
 before mankind was split
 
into Adam and Eve. The garden is silent;
8




in it man lives in such amity with God that he is at one with all things,
 
whether they are animals or objects—as a result of this he has no
 need to differentiate them from himself by naming them. The place
 is thoughtless, wordless, and sexless. This location adds a further
 term to Addie’s equation. Eden is the source: “Eden = virginity =
 silence.”
The story has a sequel. God divided man into man and woman,
 
the single unit was doubled with the removal of the rib. The newly
 created woman ate the apple and offered man sin in two forms,
 sexual knowledge (a source of infinite multiplication) and knowl
­edge as thought, which since we think in words is language (itself a
 source for the infinite multiplication of ideas). The sequel is the Fall
 which as the first moment of fertility and language
 
adds a new  initial  
term to Addie’s second equation: 
“
The Fall = fertility = language.”  
According to this story language is synonymous with the Fall; like
 God’s curious creation of man in his own image, like the division of
 man into man and woman, like the expulsion from the garden into
 the world—it is one more division. The gap between every word and
 its object is for Addie the gap between man and God. Language is
 the Fall and it happens every day.
In this Addie’s Eden is more stringent than the Eden of Genesis.
 
According to the Old Testament Adam was a namer before the.
division of the sexes, nouns were part of his God-given task:
And out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field, and
 
every fowl of the air; and brought them unto Adam 
to
 see what he would call  
them; and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name
 thereof (Genesis Ch. 2, v 19).
However, the words used by Adam have a divinely sanctioned
 
naturalness. As part of Creation they seem physical in the way that
 the physical world is physical; that is to say, they contain the mate
­rials to which they refer. Their distinctive quality can be felt in the
 comparative value that we still give to “name” 
as
 against “word.”  
Something of the
 
shock that Eve’s appearance had on these names is  
recorded by Mark Twain in his Extracts from Adam's Diary:
“Monday” This new creature with the long hair is 
a
 good deal in the way. It is  
always hanging around and following me about. I don’t like this; I am not
 used to company. I wish it would stay with the other animals. . . . Cloudy
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to-day, wind in the east; think we shall have rain. ... We? Where did 
I
 get  
that word? ... I remember now—the new creature uses it.5
“We” is not the container of anything, it is an arbitrary sign. Linguis
­
tic abstractions begin to appear.
“Wednesday” I wish it would not talk; it is always talking. That sounds like 
a 
cheap fling at the poor creature, 
a
 slur; but I do not mean it so. I have never  
heard the human voice before, and any new and strange sound intruding
 itself here upon the solemn hush of these dreaming solitudes offends my e r
 and seems 
a
 false note. And this new sound is so close to me; it is right at my 
shoulder, right at my ear, first on one side and then on the other, and I am
 used only to sounds that are more or less distant from me.
Conversation pursues the occasional namer with an excess of words.
“
Friday” The naming goes recklessly on, in spite of anything I can do. I had  
a very good name for the estate, and it was musical and pretty—  
GARDEN-OF-EDEN. Privately, 
I
 continue to call it that, but not any  
longer publicly. The new creature says it is all woods and rocks and scenery,
 and therefore has no resemblance to a garden. Says it looks like a park, and
 does not look like anything but 
a
 park. Consequently, without consulting me,  
it has been new-named—NIAGARA FALLS PARK. This is sufficiently




 My life is not as happy as it was.
Things require more than one name. As words multiply, writing
 
appears not simply on signboards, but
 
on the diary pages left blank  
by Adam before the opposite sex turned up.
Addie’s version of this story
 
of all kinds of separations and multi ­
plications derives from a still more original division. Addie speaks
 enigmatically of “hearing the dark land talking of God’s love and His
 beauty and His sin” (p. 166). But how can God sin? Why should this
 sin be linked to beauty and love? What let the dark land in on the
 secret? Three questions which are clues to a first version that pre
­dates Genesis. God sinned when he divided himself. He made man
 after his own image as a mirror in which to see and love his own
 beauty. The Earth knows because, split from heaven, it too was part
 of the first fall.
5 Mark Twain,
 
Extracts from Adam’s  Diary (Harper, New York, 1901), p. 3. Sub ­
sequent pagination refers to this edition.
10
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This reconstruction may sound fanciful; however, I do believe
 
that this story, or one very like it, will give consistent answers to the
 riddles in her monologue. For example, “Why is the man Anse, the
 name Anse?” The riddle has two equally valid answers, a gap in
 the typography which is the sign for a silent and sexless Eden, or
 “Anse,” which is the sign for a fertile and fallen word. Addie solves
 the contradiction by trying to ignore the second possibility. Her
 whole life has, it seems, been lived to erase the equation, “The Fall =
 fertility = language.” She was a virgin who married in spite of
 herself, a mother outraged by each pregnancy, a silent woman
 unable to resist words. Her funeral plans are a last attempt to prove
 the primacy of “Eden = virginity = silence”; by insisting on a
 Jefferson burial, she returns
 
not simply  to her place of origin, but by  
lying in her family plot she cancels out her second (marital)
 name—Bundren, and reverts to her maiden name—a
 
name  which,  
because we never hear it, is silent.
My reading is willfully theoretical, but it seems to me that I have
 
more licence for this than Addie’s mathematical turn of mind.
 There
 
is nothing  in my equations as odd as  the oddness of the  title. I  
started with a riddle simply because the novel’s title is a riddle. As I
 Lay Dying, “I” riddles: for a long time the reader probably assumes
 that
 
the “I” refers to Addie, but her  section complicates rather  than  
affirms the assumption. If “living is getting ready to stay dead”
 (p.. 167), the “I” should refer to the living and not to Addie, who is
 dead. In this
 
case it is an anonymous pronoun asking for a name, by  
begging all names. “Dying” riddles: tradition has it that the whole
 
of  
a life may pass before the eyes of a dying man, but Addie is in her
 coffin before we reach her last testimony. The title, in her case,
 might be more aptly phrased As I Lay Dead, unless the participle is
 intended to redeem the pronoun from death, by saving it from the
 natural outcome of time and its story. The possibility is not without
 seriousness given that Addie’s goal is Eden. I started with a riddle
 about language because the entire narrative depends on Anse’s
 word: As I Lay Dying is
 
based on a verbal contract, fulfilled to cancel  
out his given word. I started with Addie’s riddle because, although
 her section is late, it reveals the extent to which she invented her
 family. Two children will make the point; Cash is conspicuously
 silent because Addie made him a reticent child, “Anse had a word
 too, love he called it. . . (but) Cash did not need to say
 
it to me,  nor I  
11
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to him” (p. 164); Darl is a word-man
 
because for Addie his concep ­
tion was a matter of
 
words, not of sperm:
Then I found that 
I
 had Darl. At first I would not believe it. Then I believed  
I would kill Anse. It was as though he had tricked me, hidden within 
a
 word  
like  within a paper screen and struck me in the back through it. (p. 164)
Above all I started with Addie’s riddle of language, because it and
 
the equations derived from it reappear constantly in Faulkner’s
 work.
III
The general assumption that Faulkner and Addie
 
share  a mythol ­
ogy of language may be
 
accurate, but if this is so it does not boil down  
to
 
a mutual mistrust of words. Addie does claim that some words are  
arbitrary, but her every effort is to cure rather than to mistrust them.
 Her literalness persuades words back through the wall of language
 into the reality
 
of what they signify; this is an  initial step: ideally she  
wants the words on the page (indeed, on all the pages) to drain
 through that hole in the text to the silence that is the original tongue.
 Since her linguistic and her sexual attitudes are intertwined, verbal
 cancellations are attended by the reduction of sexual multiples. The
 redemption of silence is marked by the restoration of the hymen.
 Mentally she kills Anse, “And then he died, he did not know that he
 was dead” (p. 166). With or without the theological subtext, the
 “murder” is vicious. More dangerously, it may sound like nonsense.
 I suspect, however, that by this stage Addie’s voice has imposed its
 own logic so that when the reader hears that one death is insufficient
 and that the evidence of the children must be removed, he is more
 concerned to discover the sense than to point the nonsense.
I
 gave Anse Dewey Dell to negative Jewel. Then I gave him Vardaman to 
replace the child I had robbed him of. And now he has three children that
 are 
his
 and not mine. (p. 168)
The calculation has two answers; either Dewey Dell and
 
Jewel are  
removed (Vardaman replacing them, to bring Anse’s total to
 three—Cash, Darl, Vardaman) or Dewey Dell and Vardaman to
­gether make up the sum of the princeless Jewel, who remains Ad
­die’s child. The second possibility, far from rupturing the psychic
12
Studies in English, Vol. 15 [1978], Art. 10
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/ms_studies_eng/vol15/iss1/10
Richard Godden 113
hymen, puts its presence to the test. Jewel, the child of a sanctified
 
man and conceived in God’s sight, is his mother’s 
“
cross” and her  
“salvation” (p. 160). The woman who claims of the natural birth of a
 child, 
“
My aloneness had been violated and then made whole again  
by the violation” (p. 164), can only believe that as Jewel is her Christ,
 so she is his Virgin Mother.
Addie’s systematic purifications are at odds with the linguistic
 
atmosphere in which Modernism developed. Ulysses, The Waste Land,
 and The Cantos depend upon an assumption about the arbitrary
 nature of the linguistic sign. When Joyce declared the voices of his
 Dubliners “paralysed” and made it difficult to
 
understand a word in  
Ulysses, except
 
in relation to another word in Ulysses, he might have  
been dramatizing a remark by Ferdinand de Saussure:
In language there are only differences. Even more important: a difference
 
generally implies positive terms between which the difference is set up; but
 in language there are only differences without positive terms. Whether we
 take the signified or the signifier, language has neither idea nor sounds that
 existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonetic
 differences that have issued from the system. The idea or phonic substance
 that a sign contains is of less importance than the other sounds that sur
­round it.6
The paragraph is an accurate summary
 
of  The Waste Land’s form.  
In January, 1922 Eliot sent Pound the first draft of a narrative poem
 shaped through Tiresias, the central narrator. The
 
returned manu ­
script has been likened by Hugh Kenner to “a dense mosaic.”
 Tiresias, whatever Eliot may say in the Notes, has been relegated to a
 short piece in one section—one of many pieces arranged in a rela
­tionship of difference. The Waste Land is not properly a mosaic; small
 coloured pebbles are generally set in mortar to describe an outline.
 Pound’s pen cleared outline away; indeed
 
his  cuts are so scrupulous  
that
 
what remains is at first glance random. The bits and pieces of  
The Waste Land do not refer back to anything behind or beyond
 themselves—whether to Tiresias or to a bundle of myths—their
 meaning, along with the meaning of each line and each word, cannot
 be grouped outside “the play of signifying relations that constitutes
 language.” Meaning as a fully constituted presence has vanished.
 Pound in his A.B.C. of
 
Reading tells a story that makes the same point:
6 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (McGraw-Hill, London,
 1966), p. 120.
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If you ask an average Westerner what ‘red’ is, he will tell you 
a
 colour, and  
then if you 
ask
 him what a colour is, he’ll tell you that it is a vibration or a  
refraction of light, and then you 
ask
 him what that is and you get, “a modality  
of being, or non-being”, or at any rate you get in beyond your depth, and
 beyond his depth.7
As an alternative Pound proposes the Chinese ideogram for “red”
 
which combines the abbreviated picture of “rose,” “iron,” “rust,”
 “cherry,” and 
“
flamingo.” This is a proposition rather than a defini ­
tion drawn up from a set of relations; it tells us what red means by
 giving us four different examples of ways in which it is manifested.
 Pound admits that language is metonymic, that is that it substitutes
 before it names. Eliot knew this; he simply
 
lacked the confidence of  
his
 
editor, who by 1922 had began to practice the idea in The Cantos.
Individual lines in The Waste Land illustrate Pound’s method and
 Saussure’s theory, 
as
 well if not better than does the overall form.
These fragments I have shored against my ruins
Why then He fit you. Hieronymo’s mad againe.
Datta. Dayadhvam. Damyata.
Shantih shantih shantih
The first thing to note is that the search for origins produces seem
­
ingly useless information. What are we supposed to think when an
 annotator, in this case Eliot himself, tells us that “Why then Ile fit
 you. Hieronymo’s mad againe” comes from Kyd’s Spanish Tragedy'.
 that “Datta. Dayadhvam. Damyata” means “Give, sympathise, con
­trol,” and that:
line 433: Shantih, repeated as here, is a formal ending to an Upanishad.
 
‘The peace that passeth all understanding’ is our equivalent to
 this word.




on the spectrum; we  don’t know what to make  of  
it. Recognizing that there is a problem here, we may open a dictio
­nary for a definition of “Upanishad,” fetch a copy of Kyd’s play, look
 at a second copy of Collected Poems so that we have the Notes con
­stantly in front of us—and, balancing an embarrassing number of
 texts—still be no nearer an answer. The mistake is to try to make
 
the
7 Ezra Pound, A.B.C. of Reading (Faber, London, 1958), p. 19.  
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words go back to a meaning at all. Eliot himself hints that meaning as
 
nomination has gone away: “Shantih . . .‘The Peace which passeth
 understanding’ is our equivalent to this word.”
Take the single line “Datta. Dayadhvam. Damyata.” The relation
 
between these three words and how Eliot is using their differences
 tells us how to read them. Datta means Give, but if Eliot had written
 the line as “Give, Sympathise, Control” something very different
 would have happened. What difference is there between Datta and
 Give? Sound. The Sanskrit sounds older, more originally religious
 than English. But in the act of
 
following up this hunch and saying  
Dayadhvam, with
 
resonance, the problem of pronunciation springs  
to mind: to imitate a Hindu is to try to be like him and at the same
 time to hear our difference from him. The pull is in two directions;
 we want to fill the word with sonorous power but feel embarrassed.
 The difficulty is not the link between the word and the meaning
 (“sympathise” is after all given in the Notes and is not much help) but
 the link between us and the word, and the word and those that
 surround it. The line, like the poem,
 
is about how language  works.
Addie’s section is at odds with all this. “The linguistic sign unites
 not a thing and a name but a concept and a sound image” (p. 66).
 Saussure’s insistence separates the word from its referent, and pre
­pares the way for the shift of attention in modern linguistics from
 semantics which is the history of the origins of words, to syntax
 which is the study of how words relate to one another in their
 context—from the source of the word to how the word performs in
 relation to other words. Frederick Jameson calls this the implicitly
 “lateral” movement of the Saussurean model, a movement which
 deflects from “the whole question of the ultimate referents of the
 linguistic sign.”8 However, it should be added that Saussure’s sub
­stitution of “concept” for referent and “sound-image” for name has
 a second and equally important effect—it is liable to dematerialize
 the external world. Addie resists both developments. She listens to
 other people’s words going
 
straight  up in thin lines “quick,” “harm ­
less,” and arbitrary; she watches as they decreate whatever it is they
 claim to name, but she will not accept what she sees and hears as
 evidence of necessary truths. Instead she talks about the “older”
 words, attempts to redeem a
 
natural language and to protect it with  
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theology. Ideally Addie, by setting each word in a one to one relation
 
with its ultimate referent, would cure the rupture language made in
 nature—restoring both to God. Or, to make use of the terminology
 of the linguistic philosopher, Jacques Derrida, she 
would
 link every  
signifier directly to “a transcendental signified” whose meaning
 
would
 be located outside the system of linguistic difference.
Addie’s theories are not without supporters among modern lin
­guists. Indeed Jacques Derrida9 accuses Saussure of committing
 
just  
Addie’s offense, when the Swiss linguist claims a privileged proxim
­ity to meaning for the spoken over the written word« Like Addie, the
 oralist grades words—by doing so he implies an inner life, or pre-
 expressive sense, to which speech is closer than print. Saussure
 argues that writing is a violence against the first, the spoken lan
­guage of man. Derrida believes the distinction false because lan
­guage is precisely the system where “the central signified, the origi
­nal or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a
 system of differences.” There is no point of origin, no natural
 meaning, because 
sign
 “Anse” whether spoken or written differs  
from the man Anse. In 
his
 essay “Speech and Phenomena” Derrida  
defines this difference« Two things happen when a word is used; the
 user “differs,” that is he expresses a distinction or a nonidentity with
 a thing; also he “defers,” that is he imposes a delay, putting off until
 later the possible naming that is at present impossible. However,
 even here, origination is present in both Derrida’s terms—“to dif
­fer” suggests a final affinity, which “to defer” will only delay. Saus-
 sure’s reverence for oral words and Addie’s claims for old words
 share a semireligious feel for the natural roots of language. This
 Derrida cannot dispel. Although signs are an arbitrary gathering of
 phonemes, the act of signification remains natural; for whether the
 user says “Anse” or writes “Anse” down, he is at least as likely to
 behave as if he is bridging a gap, as he is to believe that he is
 describing a schism.
9 Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs
 
(Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1973), particularly the essay, “The 
Voice That Keeps Silence.” I am also indebted to an unpublished essay by Walter Michaels,
 “Displaced Persons: Derrida and the Modernists.” While I disagree with the conclu
­sion he reaches, I am thankful for his help both in this essay and in conversations
 about Derrida and Pound. Walter Michaels now teaches at John Hopkins University.
Words then are both arbitrary and natural. Addie’s riddle tries to
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resolve the contradiction. I would suggest that the oral condition of
 
Southern culture and the demagogic practice of fundamentalist
 faith makes her antagonistic toward the arbitrary principle that has
 caught the imagination of the twentieth-century artist. Addie insists
 that words have an origin; this she discovers in the silence that
 precedes sexuality.
Her adherence to an original version leads her to defeat,
 
or at least  
to modify, her own sexuality: Anse/the phallus is murdered and
 pregnancy is aborted into the virgin birth. The cultural source of
 this location is the
 
Calvinist myth—a myth that acts upon Addie, but  
one with which her creator spends a great deal of his career strug
­gling. Faulkner accepts that words are female, but variously
 
recom ­
bines their sexual and their linguistic elements, in an effort to miti
­gate a logic which must condemn the verbal artist to silence, and the
 female character to spinsterhood.
Feminine entanglement with the problematics of language ex
­





not for random mythic purposes but because, no matter how  
monosyllabic, they make men talk. The absence of the absent-
 woman, a Caddy,
 
an Addie,  or a Temple Drake, is as effective  in this  
as the monosyllables of Jenny Steinbauer, Eula Varner, and Lena
 Grove.10 Language at its source is a temptation offered by the
 female. In addition, it is the primary medium for knowledge and
 therefore even for a lapsed Methodist is potentially criminal in
 expression as in source. This may explain why Faulkner sees a slight
 stain on consciousness, a stain which deepens the further a character
 moves from innocence and the more elaborate his thoughts become.
 The Faulknerian intellectual is male; he is a talker who, whether he
 knows it or not, talks endlessly about women. His pursuit of the
 subject leads him in two directions: he can become the comic (joining
 Janarius Jones, Fairchild, and Jason Compson) or the victim (along
 with Joe Gilligan, Gordon, and Quentin Compson). It is interesting
 that a second appearance by the comic guarantees his translation
 into the victim; witness the change in Horace Benbow between
 Sartoris and Sanctuary and the darkening humour of Gavin Stevens
 
10The two classifications are extreme; Faulkner will sometimes fuse silence and
 
absence to reinforce his point—keeping
 
Caddy’s voice for the most part out of the  
second half of The Sound and the Fury, and sending Eula Varner to Texas for the aptly
 named “Long Summer” (Book 3) of The Hamlet.
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from The Town to The Mansion. There is no movement in the oppo
­
site direction.
One sure alternative 
to
 the stain is silence. Certainly the mute  
fascinates Faulkner; a surprising number of characters silent by
 birth, inclination, or accident populate Yoknapatawpha, Addie
 would approve their silence and Faulkner often marks it with
 Christ-like features, ranging from the title that gives the early bellow
 of an unnamed idiot in “The Kingdom of God” a religious articula
­tion, through Mahon's double paternity and Benjy's age, to Joe
 Christmas’s initials. But a theological credential is a mixed blessing;
 all mutes are impaired mentally and some sexually—Mahon (impo
­tent war victim), Benjy (castrated idiot), Tommy (murdered simple
­ton), Joe Christmas (castrated and lynched psychopath), Jim Bond
 (congenital idiot), Ike Snopes (idiot 
in
 love with a cow). It would  
seem from this list that Faulkner adheres to Addie’s pattern, pairing
 silence with virginity and language with fertility, but that his em
­phasis is very different. When the price of innocent silence is such
 conspicuous suffering, it must be better to talk—even about women.
Equally numerous, but more problematic, is the silent central
 
woman, Caddy, Addie, Temple, and Lena are, for very different
 reasons, given few words but each is the source of many. Their
 contradictory silence is as conspicuous as their contradictory virgin
­ity; each, again for different reasons, is seen as a virgin—Benjy and
 Quentin insist on their sister’s innocence, and even Jason can only
 think of her sexuality at the risk of a headache; Addie tries to cancel
 out children and husband; the Jewish lawyer makes a case for
 Temple as a Southern virgin; and the common man, Bunch, earns
 his artist’s name, Byron, in his efforts to deny Lena’s nine-month
 pregnancy. In fact, each woman is either precociously sexual or
 inescapably fertile. Caddy and Temple are high class kept women.
 Addie is the mother of five and Lena, with only one child, clearly has
 a long way to go. The problem is yet another version of the riddle’s
 equations, but the terms have been cross-coupled so that virginity is
 linked to fertility and silence to language. This absolute contradic
­tion (present in Addie's psychic virginity) is hardly noticeable here
 because these women are mythic and their lack of a personal psy
­chology allows them 
to
 blur rather than to raise contradictions. In  
The Mansion Faulkner plays his neatest trick on the Calvinist ethos
 and in so doing effects his most delicate piece of special pleading for
18








is rendered almost silent by a Spanish bomb which damages  
her palate; however, Jefferson makes up all kinds of stories about
 her Spanish-Republican sympathies, while Gavin Stevens writes
 frantically on her note tablet. The same useful Spanish explosion
 kills her husband almost before he has arrived in the novel—an
 accident which leaves his young widow sexually mature and to all
 intents and purposes virginal. Linda is a quiet virgin in full posses
­sion of loud knowledge.
Clearly Faulkner is fascinated by the contradictory nature of
 
language, but underneath all the variables what is he actually saying?
 Each recombination of Addie’s equations shares two constants, a
 concern with the origin of words and
 
a determination to declare that  
source a female place. Such a declaration made from within a Cal
­vinist tradition, equates the fertility of language with sin, and it is this
 stain that
 
Faulkner struggles to purify. Perhaps the most curious of  
his attempts to rewrite the Fall is his account of incest. Where
 language equals sin, it is not surprising that words at their most
 precocious will be associated with the more precocious aspects of
 sexuality. The artists of the early novels are often sexually deviant,
 the form of
 
their deviancy being most consistently incestuous. It is  
possible to discover literary, historical, or personal reasons for this,
 to brand it “ill used inheritance” or “obsession.”
 
The poets of the 90’s  
and the minor Symbolists turned language and sexual standards
 upside down in almost equal proportion. Faulkner did have an
 attractive stepdaughter. Both answers seem right, yet neither feels
 wholly satisfactory. The question remains; why should a man with
­out a sister be 
so
 concerned with incest, and why should that concern  
involve extreme linguistic experimentation? Lévi-Strauss has con
­structed an analogy between kinship and language 
as
 sign systems.11  
He argues that despite 
its
 different manifestations among human  
groups, the incest taboo is the structural principle on
 
which kinship  
is based. The circulation of women determines the shape of the
 family and 
so
 finally the shape of society. The taboo governing the  
circulation depends for its authority on a system of differentiating
 signs; for example, if there were no system of signs separating
 “sister” from “other than sister,” a man might, after an absence of
11 Claude
 
Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology', particularly Part I, “Language and  
Kinship.”  
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some years and by mistake, marry his sister; therefore, quite
 
reason ­
ably, matrimonial rules and language are one and the same thing—
 their source, the prohibition on incest. Lévi-Strauss does not deal
 with the universality or origin of taboo itself. In The Scope of An
­thropology he acknowledges, without answering, Durkheim’s belief
 that the institution exists in Western Societies only as an obsolete law,
 and recognizes, without incorporating the fact, that the harmful
 consequences of consanguinial unions are a recent discovery. If
 pushed, he might concede that
 
the taboo, which is not found in the  
animal
 
world, contains an element of coercion and that, therefore,  
the linguistic sign is an artificial division 
as
 well as original  value—  
but Derrid  would not be countenanced. The weight of Lévi-Strauss’
 thought provides language with a natural source in the incest taboo.Despite its omissions, this hypothesis can be interestingly applied
 
to Faulkner. The character who contemplates incest seeks to upset
 more than
 
his parents—he  challenges the terms of his own identity.  
Lévi-Strauss notes “the double identity of Oedipus, supposed dead
 and nevertheless living, condemned child and triumphant hero”
.
12  
The remark has a wide application; the incestuous son wishes to be
 the father, as well as to be the child—the incestuous brother
 
desires  
to be both lover and blood relation. Certainly Quentin Compson in
 The Sound and the Fury claims to have created his own father, while, in
 Absalom, Absalom! as the central narrator, he effectively does so. At
 the close of Absalom, Absalom! the same character doubles for the
 incestuously jealous brother (Henry Sutpen) and the father
 (Thomas Sutpen). In As I Lay Dying, Darl’s clairvoyance multiplies
 him into Jewel and Dewey Dell; indeed his sister fears him as she
 might fear a rapist. Such escapes from the unity of identity are
 achieved because both the characters in question experiment with
 language, and their deconstruction of themselves is part of their
 separation of words from a semi-natural basis.
12Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Scope of Anthropology (Cape, London, 1971), p. 15.
However, the deviant with his perverse words, stimulates Faulk
­
ner to a last-ditch redemptive effort. Incest was the Eden-crime.
 Edmund Leach makes the point with great clarity in his essay,
 “Genesis as Myth”: 
“
In order that immortal monosexual existence in  
Paradise may be exchanged for fertile heterosexual existence in
 reality . . . Adam must acquire a wife. To this end Adam must
20
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eliminate a sister.”13 At the gates of Eden one flesh, Adam and
 
Adam’s rib called Eve, had to become two fleshes. Since Genesis
 records no alternative partners, brother and sister became husband
 and
 
wife, and the  Biblical  account ignores its own  implication—that  
incest was committed in the marriage bed.
13Edmund Leach, Genesis as Myth and Other Essays (Cape, London, 1971), p. 15.
Incest was the first of many multiplications—one flesh/two
 
fleshes, immortal/mortal, Eden/Earth, thing/word. It was the act
 that got man out of Eden into the world and 
as
 such it broke the  
silence in earnest. Language was no longer a God-given toy; it was
 instigated as a system of differences, where outside the garden
 difference would multiply, requiring words
 
to keep pace with it. It is  
easy to see how the redemptive imagination might cast the incestu
­ous hero as the champion of a monosexual Eden: attracted to his
 own blood he seeks to escape the social and sexual differences
 organized by language—and by recommitting the original sin to
 reapproach the original unity. Certainly Quentin and Darl, al
­though
 
they multiply  themselves, do not go forth and multiply. The  
psychic union between sister and brother is not undertaken with
 children in mind; indeed Quentin contemplates self-emasculation,
 and Darl locked in Jackson is removed from temptation. Just as
 these characters do not procreate, 
so
 their linguistic creativity for all  
its ingenuity is finally impaired. Silence intrudes; Quentin prepares
 for suicide by clinically purging his rhetoric; Darl foaming “yes” is
 not only at a loss for words but has lost his voice. The redemptive
 twist is as labored as it is unconscious. However, its details are
 important in that they suggest that Addie’s silent stories figure
 largely, if silently, in Faulkner’s imagination. His use of incest is
 open to mythic explanation. Certainly in his works the crime often
 lacks an adequate psychological basis and still more strangely is
 without criminal stain. This is because it is the linguistic aspect of
 deviancy that intrigues Faulkner. Incest, for the Faulkner reader,
 whether or not he has access to the theology, feels like an innocent
 crime since inescapably in the sub-text it is the innocent crime.




reinforce the hero who desires to  heal language. The incestu ­
ous brother is
 
set outside social codes by his indulgence of additional  
sexual quirks; Quentin’s latent ability to stimulate Shreve, coupled
 
21
Godden: Addie Bundren and Language
Published by eGrove, 1978
122 Addie Bundren and Language
with his fascinated memory of Versh’s mutilation story,14 establish
 
an opposition to sexuality as fertility; Darl recalls an apparently
 casual moment of
 
masturbation, and Joe Christmas shares in both  
his onanism and in Quentin’s submerged homosexuality. More
 dramatically Light in
 
August links the castration complex to silence  
with a lynching
 
in which the removal of the male member  confuses  
social language and stimulates a perversely potent jet
 
of blood, “[it]  
seemed to rush out of his pale body like the rush of sparks from a
 rising rocket”.15 Jefferson will not easily account for the metamor
­phosis of a black phallus into a white phallus, and Faulkner’s
 rhetoric celebrates the destruction of social codes as an obscurely
 religious triumph. The castrated man is potent because his ruined
 body has a positive place in the original myth of asexuality, and the
 siren wail that sounds at the end of the ritual 
“
passes out of the realm  
of hearing” (p. 440), not just because it is unbearably loud, but
 because it marks the defeat of language, according to the old story.
14 William Faulkner, The Sound and the Fury (Chatto & Windus, London, 1959),
 
p. 114. “Versh 
told
 me about a man mutilated himself. He went into the woods and  
did it with 
a
 razor, sitting in a ditch. A broken razor flinging them backward over his  
shoulder the same motion complete the jerked skein of blood backward not looping.
 But that’s not it. It’s not having them
 
then I would say O That That’s Chinese I don’t  
know Chinese.”
 15 William Faulkner, Light in August (Chatto & Windus, London, 1960), p. 440.
At levels less perverse
 
and  more distinct, the  carefully maintained  
bachelor status of the two major narrators of the triology and Ike
 McCaslin’s recovery from the wire-noose of his wife’s sexual caress
 in “The Bear” are socially defensible modes of dismemberment.
 Each of the three figures combines an escape from fertility with a
 restorative quest. Ratliff and Stevens between them purify the
 stories of the town; their constant revision of Snopes anecdotes sets
 words in the purer linguistic medium of oral discourse, whose con
­stantly moving system of
 
approximation disposes of words that do  
not adequately name. Moreover, Ratliff is a master of silence, and in
 The Town instructs his collaborator in its usage as the foundation of
 all careful discourse. More like Addie, Ike McCaslin pays off and
 hopes to cancel out the children of his grandfather’s miscegena
­tions; in addition, he refuses to benefit
 
from the sale of the wilder ­
ness to timber companies whose locomotives penetrate his child
­hood garden-like snakes.
22





masculine or feminine, repeats and reor ­
ganizes the terms of Addie’s equations, in order to return language
 at least to a graduated purity. Faulkner
 
shares, mistrusts, and mod ­
ifies Addie’s restorative impulse—an impulse that informs such
 seemingly diverse concerns as psychology,
 
style, theology, and sexu ­
ality.
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